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Financial Development and Economic Growth: New Lessons from Small Open Economies 
 
ABSTRACT 
This paper develops a political economy framework to explain the underlying financial 
mechanisms through which redistributive policies may affect both the relative level of per capita 
income growth rates, and the relative stability of growth paths across countries. It proposes that 
socio-politically motivated redistributive policies characterized by financial exclusion may 
undermine financial intermediation. By extension, it argues that politically unconnected 
productive firms may face binding financial constraints in normal times, and both politically 
connected and unconnected firms may jointly face binding financial constraints in abnormal 
times. This may give rise to an output gap in normal times that diverges in abnormal times. It is 
shown that this theoretical framework can explain growth disparities between Jamaica and 
Barbados since the 1960s. In addition, it offers new lessons on the importance of effective long-
run pro-poor-pro-growth strategies for developing countries with acute income inequality. 
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Financial Development and Economic Growth: New Lessons from Small Open Economies 
 
1. Introduction 
There is a burgeoning literature that almost uniformly points to financial development as 
a precondition for long-run economic growth (Levine, 1997, 2005); that is, countries with banks 
that perform financial intermediation relatively well and have more developed stock markets are 
expected to grow faster over the long term, all else equal. While disagreements remain about the 
fundamental determinants of financial development, there is an emerging view that politics 
matters (Rajan and Zingales, 2003). The primary purpose of this paper is to develop a theoretical 
framework that explains the mechanisms through which politics affects financial intermediation; 
and in turn, how the latter affects both the relative level of per capita income growth rates, and 
the relative stability of the growth paths across countries.  
It will be shown that this politics-finance-growth perspective can explain observed 
growth disparities between Jamaica and Barbados since the 1960s. But this choice of countries 
perhaps raises the question of what may be learned from an account of the growth experiences of 
two small tropical island states when neither is generally known to represent an economic 
miracle by international standards; however, this paper illustrates that they warrant special 
attention for at least two reasons.  First, for developing countries with acute income inequality, 
they illustrate very well the pitfalls of not carefully choosing long-run economic growth 
strategies that are both pro-poor and pro-growth over the long term.  
Second, the Jamaica-Barbados growth disparities are not adequately explained by the 
law-finance-growth perspective. According to this perspective, legal institutions influence 
corporate finance and financial development, which in turn influence long-run economic growth 
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(Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine, 2003a; Beck et al. 2003b; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, 
Shleifer, and Vishny, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000; Levine 1998, 1999). Specifically, countries that 
are willing and able to efficiently enforce well-defined laws that protect the rights of creditors 
and minority shareholders encourage savers or investors to confidently place their funds in both 
private and public debt and equity markets. When allocated to the most profitable projects, these 
funds may relax external financing constraints; and thereby facilitate firm growth, industrial 
expansion and labor productivity growth.  
Thus, to the extent that the legal systems of countries are tied to their legal heritage (i.e. 
English common law and French civil law), cross-country differences in per capita income over 
the long term may be explained in terms of cross-country differences in legal origins. However, 
this does not seem to bear out in the Jamaica-Barbados case.  Since the 1960s, a real per capita 
income gap has emerged between Jamaica and Barbados, which dramatically widened during the 
oil shock episode of 1973 (Henry and Miller, 2009). Based on the law-finance-growth 
perspective, this observed growth disparity between Jamaica and Barbados is not expected. This 
is so because both countries share a common institutional heritage: not only did they operate 
under the same coercive plantation system that was controlled by the same colonial master 
(Williams, 1970); but after gaining independence four years apart (Jamaica in 1962, and 
Barbados in 1966) they went on to model their legal and political systems after those of Britain 
(i.e. English common law and a Westminster Parliamentary democracy that is dominated by two 
political parties) (Antoine, 1999; Payne, 1993).  
The Jamaica-Barbados growth puzzle presents two questions that are not adequately 
addressed either by the law-finance-growth perspective, or the politics-finance-growth 
perspective in its current form (Rajan and Zingales, 2003). First, why has the standard of living 
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been falling in Jamaica relative to Barbados since the 1960s? Second, why is the growth path 
apparently less stable for Jamaica relative to Barbados? This paper attempts to fill these gaps in 
the extant finance-growth literature by addressing these two questions, among others; 
specifically, it also uses the disparate Jamaica-Barbados growth experiences to address the 
question of how developing countries with acute income inequality may successfully reduce 
poverty without sacrificing growth over the long term. 
To establish the theoretical foundation for a comparative analysis of the growth 
experiences of Jamaica and Barbados, this paper expands the existing politics-finance-growth 
perspective (Rajan and Zingales, 2003). In particular, it introduces the concepts of socio-
politically motivated (SPM) redistributive policies as opposed to socio-economically motivated 
(SEM) redistributive policies: an SPM redistributive policy is a public policy that is motivated by 
the desire to equalize economic outcomes and engenders financial exclusion; meanwhile, an 
SEM redistributive policy is a public policy that is primarily motivated by the desire to equalize 
opportunity and engenders financial inclusion. 
It is argued that SPM redistributive policies may lead to a relatively slow per capita 
income growth rate, and a relatively unstable growth path over the long term. These growth 
outcomes may be traced to the adverse and potentially persistent effects of such policies on 
financial intermediation. Specifically, redistributive policies of the socio-political variety may 
stand in the way of financial sector reforms that are geared toward improving the efficiency and 
stability of the banking system; thus, they may not only undermine financial intermediation, but 
also contribute to banking crises.  
In general terms, this theoretical framework suggests that actual output will be lower than 
potential output if bank credit is disproportionately allocated to politically connected, but low-
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productivity firms in normal times (i.e. periods void of crises or major external shocks); and the 
output gap that emerges in normal times will diverge in abnormal times (i.e. periods of crises or 
major external shocks). These expected outcomes are consistent with relatively low per capita 
income in normal times, and a generally unstable growth path as the economy traverses both 
normal and abnormal times. Unlike Barbados, Jamaica adopted SPM redistributive policies 
under democratic socialism in the 1970s. Thus, to the extent that both countries have 
approximately the same economic growth potential, this theoretical framework can explain: (1) 
why real per capita income grew at a slower rate for Jamaica throughout the relatively normal 
times of the 1960s; and (2) why aggregate output contracted more in Jamaica relative to 
Barbados during the abnormal times of the 1970s when both economies were buffeted by the 
1973 oil shock. 
There are two notable studies that are most related to this paper. The first study is by 
Henry and Miller (2009). They provide what may be called a macroeconomics-growth 
perspective on the growth disparities between Jamaica and Barbados.  This account similarly 
acknowledges that the law-finance-growth view does not adequately explain the growth 
disparities of these two countries. Its essential message is that Barbados has economically 
outperformed Jamaica because it practices “good” economics (i.e. fiscal discipline) with greater 
fortitude and consistency. However, as this paper will show, this account is incomplete. This 
paper expands on the work of Henry and Miller (2009) by showing, for instance, that there was 
greater income inequality in Jamaica relative to Barbados well before they gained independence 
in the 1960s. This finding is non-trivial. Importantly, it implies that Jamaica’s post-independence 
challenge was not merely to grow on par with Barbados, but to also close the initial income 
inequality gap.  
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As will be shown in this paper, Jamaica successfully closed its pre-independence income 
inequality gap with Barbados by the 1970s, but in its place emerged a considerably wide real per 
capita income gap. Thus, Jamaica has been in search of an elusive pro-poor and pro-growth 
strategy at least since the 1960s. Since an understanding of this reality is not conveyed in the 
emerging macroeconomics-growth perspective, it is not well-placed to adequately inform 
policymakers on how to proceed more fruitfully in formulating an effective long-run pro-poor-
pro-growth strategy. However, by squarely addressing this issue, this paper has the potential to 
not only advance the economic growth agenda in Jamaica; but more generally in developing 
countries that are currently grappling with the social and economic problems associated with 
acute income inequality and poverty. 
As will be also illustrated in this paper, the persistent underperformance and virtual 
breakdown of financial intermediation in Jamaica may be directly linked to the adverse effects of 
the SPM redistributive policies that it adopted under democratic socialism in the 1970s. 
Although the core ideas of democratic socialism appear in Henry and Miller (2009), its 
implications for financial intermediation are not explored. Therefore, by shedding new light on 
this issue, among others, this paper provides a more complete treatment of the disparate Jamaica-
Barbados growth experiences. 
Finally, the study by Iyare and Moore (2011) is also closely related to this paper. In 
particular, its present time series econometric evidence which suggests that while there is a 
systematic bi-directional relationship between various measures of financial development and 
long-run economic growth in Barbados, financial development is not found to have a direct 
impact on long-run economic growth in Jamaica. While these results are interesting, the authors 
do not adequately explain why the financial sector seems to have direct impact on long-run 
8 
 
economic growth in Barbados and not in Jamaica. The politics-finance-growth perspective that is 
articulated in this paper fills this theoretical void; in particular, it explains why, and the extent to 
which, financial intermediation was compromised in Jamaica relative to Barbados over the last 
three decades. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section develops a 
theoretical framework that establishes the links between SPM redistributive policies and 
financial intermediation; and in turn, between the latter and economic growth performance.  
Next, this theoretical framework is then used to evaluate the growth experiences of Jamaica and 
Barbados since the 1960s. The final section summarizes the key theoretical insights and 
empirical results; and concludes by discussing their policy implications, and potentially fruitful 
directions for future research. 
2. Theoretical Framework 
According to the political-economy framework of Rajan and Zingales (2003), politics 
may get in the way of growth-enhancing financial sector reforms. Specifically, self-serving 
politicians may impede long-run economic growth by granting exclusive privileges to politically 
influential or rent-seeking individuals or groups. However, it is not only the desire to remain in 
power that may lead politicians to engage in such behavior. There are at least three other 
potential motivations for the adoption of redistributive policies in one form or another. These are 
discussed in the next section that immediately follows. 
SPM and SEM Redistributive Policies 
If the state has incomplete control over the use of force and violence, the government 
may be inclined to grant rents to apparently powerful individuals or groups to reduce the 
likelihood of social unrest and violence, and thereby maintain social order and political 
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continuity (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2013; North, Wallis, Webb and Weingast, 2013). In 
addition, to the extent that the government embraces equity or social justice as its core value, it 
may be prepared to transfer resources in one form or another from individuals or groups deemed 
well-off to others deemed less fortunate. 
In these first two cases, redistributive policies are primarily predicated on both social and 
political considerations rather than purely economic ones. In other words, they represent 
departures from market-based principles that emphasize competition and efficiency. In the first 
case, the government is willing to undermine market competition by granting monopoly 
privileges because the perceived efficiency gains from competitive markets do not adequately 
compensate for the perceived risks and costs of social and political instability. In the second 
case, the government either deliberately or inadvertently sacrifices the efficiency gains from 
competitive markets by placing too much emphasis on the equalization of economic outcomes. 
These two cases may be conceptualized as examples of socio-political motivations for 
redistributive policies.  
Socio-political motivations for redistributive policies are to be distinguished from socio-
economic motivations. This brings us to the third motivation for redistributive policies. There 
may be a strong economic rationale for redistributive policies when imperfections in capital 
markets are either difficult or too costly to resolve; and thereby perpetuate financing constraints 
and wealth inequality. For instance, if there is a unique invariant wealth distribution, and the 
rapid accumulation of capital among the rich increases the availability of funds for the poor 
through a “trickle-down” process, then there is room for government intervention in a free 
market economy (Aghion and Bolton, 1997). Specifically, not only will transfers from the rich to 
the poor accelerate the rate at which the economy converges to its steady-state distribution of 
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wealth, but such transfers may foster production efficiency because they relax the financing 
constraints that the poor disproportionately face; hence, the latter will have a stronger incentive 
to pursue lucrative investment opportunities under financially inclusive policies. 
The primary objective of the government in this latter case is to achieve greater equality 
of opportunity rather than the equality of income. While greater equality of opportunity through 
financially inclusive policies may increase the rate at which the poor are able to improve their 
welfare as the growth rate of per capita income accelerates, the government accepts that even 
when everyone becomes better off over time, some individuals will still be better off than others 
in the in long term. 
Importantly, SEM redistributive policies that emphasize financial inclusion have pro-poor 
and pro-growth characteristics should be particularly appealing to developing-country 
governments that have to deal with the social and economic problems that are associated with 
acute income inequality and poverty (Beck and Demirgüç-Kunt, 2008; Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt 
and Martinez Peria, 2007). SEM redistributive policies may not only achieve social cohesion by 
reducing income inequality, albeit not perfectly; but may also be superior to SPM redistributive 
policies in terms of long-run economic growth outcomes. In what follows next, I discuss in 
greater detail the implications of SPM redistributive policies for financial development. 
SPM Redistributive Policies and Financial Development 
In practical terms, redistributive policies of the socio-political variety may feature the 
erection of entry barriers that effectively shield inefficient, but politically connected firms from 
competition at home and abroad. Similar barriers in the form of financial repression engender 
financial exclusion. Specifically, politically connected players in the banking sector may earn 
monopoly profits, or enjoy exclusive access to cheap bank credit in the presence of not only 
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entry restrictions, but also controls on credit allocation and the interest rates offered or charged 
on savings or loans, respectively. But a financially repressed banking system cannot be expected 
to effectively perform financial intermediation. Still, vested interests have an incentive to 
organize and resist financial reforms because they risk losing the rents that they enjoy under 
financial repression (Olson, 1965; Stigler, 1971).  A similar pattern of organized resistance is 
anticipated in response to proposed international trade and financial policies that may unleash 
competitive forces, and erode monopoly rents.  
Importantly, it is not only private interests that have an incentive to block financial sector 
reforms; the government may also have an incentive to do so as well. To see why this may be the 
case, it is sufficient to recognize that SPM redistributive policies incur fiscal costs that may not 
be fully covered by current tax revenues. To the extent that these policies are sustained, the 
government may have to borrow at home or abroad to finance the potentially large fiscal deficits 
that such policies may generate.  In this case, financial repression may enable the government to 
raise funds at home under more favorable terms. Since financial repression essentially enables 
the government to implicitly tax domestic savings, the incentives to block financial sector 
reforms will be particularly strong under fiscally burdensome redistributive policies of the socio-
political variety. 
In sum, the foregoing discussion suggests that while SPM redistributive policies may 
engender financial exclusion, SEM redistributive may foster financial inclusion. This leads to the 
following three related propositions: 
Proposition 1: In normal times, state-controlled or politically directed banks will 
disproportionately allocate bank credit to politically connected low-productivity firms on 
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favorable terms, while disproportionately rationing credit to privately owned and 
independently operated high-productivity firms. 
Proposition 2a: In normal times, an output gap (i.e. difference between actual output and 
potential output) will emerge; and 
Proposition 2b: The normal-time output gap will diverge in abnormal times. 
Since the foregoing discussion already offers arguments in support of proposition 1, it is 
worthwhile to reflect on propositions 2a and 2b. According to proposition 2a, if a country’s 
banking system primarily operates under political directives, then its actual output will be lower 
than its potential output because the most productive firms are credit rationed; and thereby 
unable to implement their investment and production plans. It follows that the actual (real) per 
capita income will be lower than its potential level, all else equal; alternatively, the growth rate 
of real per capita income will be slower than what is attainable given the economy’s resources. 
Meanwhile, proposition 2b suggests that countries with politically controlled banking 
systems will have a relatively unstable growth path. This is so because external shocks may 
trigger multiple binding external financing constraints (for both politically connected and 
unconnected firms) when the efficiency of financial intermediation is compromised, and difficult 
times force the government to reduce bank credit allocations even to politically connected firms. 
To the extent that financially constrained firms jointly reduce output, the contractionary effect of 
a single external may be amplified. This in turn may cause an output gap that had emerged in 
normal times to dramatically diverge in abnormal times. By extension, this implies a relatively 
unstable growth path. 
Perhaps the clearest example of a politically connected firm is a state-owned enterprise 
(SOE). To the extent that the government places a high priority on full employment, SOEs are 
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likely to be overstaffed, inefficient and loss-making entities (Kornai, 1979, 1986). This is so 
because the government cannot credibly commit to withdraw funding from SOEs if doing so 
leads to massive layoffs. SOE managers perhaps understand this conflicting position that the 
government faces; hence, they have an incentive to operate large firms, and the same time do 
little to improve operational efficiency. As the experience in former communist economies 
confirm, SOEs may be money-losing entities that drain fiscal resources. 
Thus, in line with proposition 2a, actual output in normal times will be lower than 
potential output if SOEs disproportionately receive bank credit on favorable terms while 
privately owned and independently operated firms are disproportionately credit rationed. In 
abnormal times (i.e. an oil shock episode), SOEs will face stiffer competition for bank credit as 
the government grapples with the challenge of financing other social priorities (i.e. education, 
health, infrastructure development etc.). This implies that SOEs are likely to be credit rationed 
during abnormal times as their privately owned and independently operated counterparts. This in 
turn implies that multiple external financing constraints will bind; hence, both publicly- and 
privately-owned firms may reduce production at virtually the same time. As already noted, this 
may increase output volatility, and engender a relatively unstable growth path. 
3. A Comparative Analysis of Jamaica and Barbados Growth Dynamics 
In this section, it will be shown that the economic growth dynamics that are described in 
proposition 2b are consistent with the growth disparities of Jamaica and Barbados between the 
1960s and 1970s. That is, not only were real per capita growth rates lower for Jamaica during the 
relatively normal to booming years of the 1960s, but aggregate output contracted to a much 
greater degree in Jamaica than in Barbados during the oil shock episode of 1973; thus, the 
Jamaican economy has followed a relatively unstable growth path since the 1960s. 
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The quantitative and qualitative data that will be employed in this comparative analysis 
are organized, and conveniently shown in Tables 1, 2 and 3 along with related references. In 
particular, Table 1 presents data on selected economic, political and social indicators for both 
countries. Meanwhile, Tables 2 and 3 present a list of the major economic phenomena in both 
countries for the following periods: 1960 - 1970, 1971 – 1980 and 1981 – 1990s. To be sure, this 
list is not exhaustive; however, it captures some of the most important developments that 
transpired in each country between the 1960s and the 1990s. 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
There are two notable periods. First, 1973 marks the period in which both countries and 
the global economy were buffeted by the first oil shock of the 1970s. Second, 1972 – 1980 marks 
the period in which the People’s National Party (PNP) governed in Jamaica. There is consensus 
that the PNP’s adoption of democratic socialism during this period not only marked a 
fundamental departure from the relatively market-friendly approach of the Jamaica Labour Party 
(JLP) during the 1960s, but also from the relatively market-friendly approach of the Barbados 
Labour Party (BLP) and Democratic Labour Party (DLP) during the 1970s in Barbados (see 
Tables 2 and 3). According to the typology of redistributive policies that is developed in this 
paper, Jamaica departed from Barbados in the 1970s by adopting SPM redistributive policies. 
However, without an understanding of the pre-independence differences between these two 
countries, it may not be obvious why the former adopted such policies and not the latter. The 
next section addresses this issue. 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
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Background 
Pre-independence Differences  
The gini coefficient is a common measure of income inequality, and is defined on the 
interval 0 to 1, with perfect equality and perfect inequity corresponding to the lower and upper 
bounds, respectively. Table 1 shows that the average gini coefficients for Jamaica and Barbados 
were approximately 0.58 and 0.46, respectively, during the 1950s. This implies that Jamaica had 
greater income disparity before either country gained independence from Britain (Jamaica, 1962; 
Barbados, 1966). But this is not surprising because Barbados was ahead of Jamaica in terms of 
taking definitive steps to improve its social infrastructure (i.e. health, education, water supply 
and housing) in the 1950s (see Tables 2 and 3).  
At the same time, if Barbados initially had less income inequality and better social 
infrastructure than Jamaica prior to independence, the organization of economic and social life in 
Barbados potentially was more likely to engender social cohesion and political stability relative 
to Jamaica. Alternatively, there was a potentially greater latent demand for redistributive policies 
among the poor in Jamaica, who would later exercise their collective power and influence on 
electoral outcomes in the post-independence period. This in turn implies that the fate of political 
polities would be predicated on the extent to which their redistributive packages met the approval 
of the poor, but collectively influential voters. Thus, the probability that SPM redistributive 
policies would be adopted during the post-independence period, conditioned on the distribution 
of national income, was most likely higher for Jamaica than Barbados.  
Interestingly, after leading Jamaica into a new age of self-determination in 1962, the JLP 
was struggling to maintain its hold on power on the eve of the 1970s. On the surface, this is 
surprising because Jamaica had successfully attracted FDI in the 1960s to primarily finance the 
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expansion of the bauxite industry during a commodity boom (see Table 2). In addition, the 
economy was looking set for a new era of prosperity with an average per capita GDP growth rate 
of approximately 4.2 percent (see Table 1). However, beneath all of this, was growing discontent 
because the realized economic gains were concentrated in the hands of a few. Given the virtual 
absence of social safety nets in the form of unemployment insurance, among others, the many 
rural workers who were displaced from the declining agricultural sector were faced with chronic 
economic hardships. It is in this setting that the Michael Manley led PNP administration grew in 
stature on the core message of equity and social justice, and democratic socialism found friends 
among the bulging ranks of the unemployed and the working poor. 
Post-independence Growth Challenge 
If Jamaica were to be a prosperous and socially and politically stable nation in the post-
independence period, a long-run economic growth strategy had to be formulated that was pro-
poor and pro-growth. However, the evidence suggests that such a growth strategy has eluded 
Jamaica since the 1960s. The data in Table 1 seems to supports this view; specifically, it shows 
that although Jamaica started out in the 1950s with a gini coefficient of 0.58 compared to 0.46 
for Barbados, its gini coefficient averaged 0.45 compared to 0.48 for Barbados in the 1970s. In 
contrast, an initial per capita income gap of $1,187 ($3,395 - $2,208) dramatically widened as 
aggregate output contracted considerably more in Jamaica than Barbados during the oil shock 
episode of 1973.  
In sum, the forgoing discussion suggests that there are at least two related pre-
independence differences between Jamaica and Barbados that should inform comparative 
analyses of their growth dynamics. First, Jamaica was initially less equal in economic outcomes 
relative to Barbados. And second, Jamaica had a different growth challenge going into the post-
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independence period; specifically, not only did Jamaica have to at least match Barbados in terms 
of real per capita growth rate to prevent a major divergence in the relatively small real per capita 
income gap in the early 1960s; it also had to find a way to also move closer to Barbados in terms 
of income distribution, social infrastructure and social capital.  
Macroeconomic Fundamentals and Financial Intermediation before the 1973 Oil Shock 
While Jamaica entered the post-independence period as a less economically equal society 
relative to Barbados, a number of economic fundamentals in Jamaica were either looking 
relatively good or at least on par with Barbados. Table 1 shows that Jamaica had: (1) a 
significantly higher national savings rate; (2) a similar rate of capital formation; (3) a similarly 
low fiscal deficit-GDP ratio, and (4) a similar single-digit inflation rate. Altogether, the 
macroeconomic fundamentals looked relatively good for these two countries in the 1960s. Still, 
based on the trade openness measure shown in Table 1, it is clear that Barbados was integrated in 
the global economy through trade linkages to a significantly greater degree than Jamaica. This is 
actually consistent with the export-led growth strategy that Barbados adopted in the 1960s (see 
Table 3).  
The question of whether Barbados was initially and subsequently more financially 
developed leading up the 1973 oil shock is an important one. This is so because the growth 
dynamics that are predicted in proposition 2b are predicated on financial underdevelopment as 
reflected in limited financial intermediation, if any. Since Jamaica’s growth dynamics are more 
consistent with proposition 2b, it has to be established that Jamaica has been financially 
underdeveloped relative to Barbados to ensure internal consistency. 
While there is no agreement in the finance-growth literature on which measure of 
financial development is superior, the three common measures are M2-to-GDP ratio, commercial 
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bank assets as a percentage of total financial sector assets and bank credit to the private sector as 
a percentage of GDP (Demetriades and Hussein, 1996; Jung; 1986; Odedokun, 1998). This paper 
uses the third measure.   
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
Table 1 shows bank credit as a percentage as GDP was an average of 9.5% and 27.5% for 
Jamaica and Barbados, respectively, during the 1960s. This implies that Jamaica was less 
financially developed over this period; said differently, there was apparently less financial 
intermediation in Jamaica relative to Barbados in the 1960s. During the 1970s, however, bank 
credit as a percentage of GDP averaged 43.2% and 44.6% for Jamaica and Barbados, 
respectively. One may be tempted to infer that financial intermediation in Jamaica was now on 
par with Barbados in the 1970s; however, as will be shown, such an inference is misleading, if 
not inaccurate. To accurately interpret the significant expansion of bank credit in Jamaica 
relative to its GDP in the 1970s, it is important to evaluate the differences in the macroeconomic 
fundamentals of both countries. This task is undertaken in the next section. 
Macroeconomic Fundamentals and Financial Intermediation during the 1973 Oil Shock 
Between the 1960s and 1970s, Table 1 shows that: (1) the national savings rate declined 
in Jamaica, but increased in Barbados; (2) the national investment rate declined in Jamaica, but 
remained virtually unchanged in Barbados; (3) Jamaica’s fiscal deficit-to-GDP ratio increased by 
almost 7 times its average level in the 1960s to reach 15.5%, while Barbados’ fiscal deficit-to-
GDP increased by almost 2 times its average level in the 1960s to reach to 5.3%; (4) although the 
inflation rate moved from single digits to double digits in both countries, prices were rising 3.4% 
faster in Jamaica; and finally (5) with average per capita growth rates of -4.3% and 2.7% for 
Jamaica and Barbados, respectively, the Jamaican economy contracted considerably more than 
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the Barbadian economy in the 1970s; thus, while Barbados had accommodated the oil shock 
relatively well, Jamaica’s dramatically declining macroeconomic fundamentals suggest that it 
had been gravely wounded by the oil shock (Worrell, 1981). Importantly, the magnitude of the 
contractionary effect of the oil shock on the Jamaican economy reflected multiple internal 
weaknesses that had accumulated in the 1970s. 
Table 1 shows that the Jamaican government (i.e. PNP administration) had become a 
direct player in the economy in the 1970s. In short order, it acquired companies in industries 
ranging from banking, telecommunications, utilities, tourism, manufacturing, transportation to 
mining. As suggested earlier, the SOEs that operated across these sectors were disproportionately 
inefficient, money-losing entities that drained fiscal resources. Jamaica’s fiscal deficits not only 
grew in line with the costly acquisitions that it made, but also in line with the relatively high 
operational costs that SOEs incurred compared to the value that they generated. Thus, the fact 
that these SOEs were present in Jamaica to a significantly larger extent than in Barbados 
suggests that the former had to contend with far more grave fiscal challenges during the 1970s.  
To finance its rapidly growing fiscal deficit, the government resorted to financially 
repressive measures to mobile large amounts of funds and keep down the interest rates on 
borrowed funds. In particular, administrative controls coupled with high reserve requirements 
were employed to restrict lending to the private sector (see Table 2). In addition, the government 
sought to lower its cost of capital by imposing ceilings on the interest rates that banks were able 
to offer or charge on deposits or loans, respectively (see Table 2). Thus, although the size of the 
banking sector in Jamaica and Barbados were similar in relative terms during the 1970s, Jamaica 
perhaps still lagged Barbados in the area of financial development based its extensive use of 
financially repressive policies during this period. 
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Altogether, when we evaluate the macroeconomic fundamentals for Jamaica and 
Barbados in the 1970s, there are good reasons to believe that the post-independence expansion of 
the Jamaican banking system did not translate into financial intermediation on par with 
Barbados. The history of Jamaica’s banking sector may be read as follows (see Table 2): (1) it 
played an apparently limited role, if any, in financial intermediation during the 1960s because the 
expansion of the bauxite industry was largely financed by FDI; (2) although the banking sector 
expanded in the 1970s, financial intermediation was compromised due to the pervasive use of 
financially repressive policies that steered credit away from the relatively productive private 
sector to the grossly inefficient public sector; and (3) a major breakdown of financial 
intermediation ensured in 1990s as some of the leading domestic commercial and merchant 
banks, insurance companies and building societies were deemed insolvent and/or closed.  
The view that banks in Jamaica have systematically underperformed as financial 
intermediaries relative to those in Barbados is consistent with the findings of Iyare and Moore 
(2011). Specifically, the authors provide time series econometric evidence which suggests that 
while there is a bi-directional relationship between the financial sector and long-run economic 
growth in Barbados, the financial sector does not appear to have a direct impact on long-run 
economic growth in Jamaica. Still, a disclaimer is warranted.  
Notwithstanding the evidently better performance of Barbados’ banking system, the 
reader should understand that this paper does not suggest that Barbados represents a model for 
either Jamaica or other small open economies in the area of banking and finance. In fact, 
Barbados is yet to meet international standards in the area of banking regulations and 
supervision. That financial development is an unfinished agenda in Barbados is evidenced by the 
emergence of a striving shadow banking system. For example, the 1986 collapse of Trade 
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Confirmers, an unregulated finance company, illustrates an early weakness in the Barbadian 
regulatory and supervisory architecture that governs its financial sector (see Table 3). Therefore, 
both Jamaica and Barbados have much more work to do to foster greater integrity, efficiency and 
stability in their banking systems.  
Economic Isolation versus Integration  
In this penultimate section, I evaluate the different approaches that Jamaica and Barbados 
have taken in relation to integration in the global economy. Although Jamaica received relatively 
large sums of FDI in the 1960s, it was not as well-networked as Barbados in the global economy 
through trade linkages as suggested by its relatively low trade openness score (see Table 1). 
During the 1970s, a variety of measures ranging from foreign exchange control, import and 
export license requirements, among others, collectively made Jamaica a relatively isolated nation 
(see Table 1). What should be clear is that financial repression during the 1970s not only 
compromised the workings of the banking sector, but also the foreign exchange market. The 
latter undermined the ability of domestic firms to effectively participate in the global economy 
by either selling goods abroad, or purchasing goods from foreigners. Thus, it is not surprising 
that Jamaica was required to commit to both trade and financial liberalization reforms under the 
World Bank structural adjustment programs during the 1990s (see Table 2).  
In contrast to Jamaica, Barbados has been well-networked in the global economy at least 
since the 1960s. This has created a particular set of challenges and priorities. In particular, 
external price stability is important. It is against this backdrop that Barbados’ fixed (pegged) 
exchange regime takes on significance. In 1975, Barbados pegged its currency to the US dollar at 
a parity of B$2:US$1 (see Table 3). Beyond the external price stability that this currency peg 
engenders, it also forces the Barbadian government to be more preoccupied with fiscal 
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management than monetary policy. This is so because it essentially sacrifices monetary 
autonomy by maintaining a pegged exchange regime. In other words, the Barbadian monetary 
authorities have to coordinate their policies in tandem with the US Federal Reserve. This means 
that the former is unable to set interest rates and use other monetary instruments to maintain 
internal price stability (i.e. low and stable inflation rate). 
Importantly, the maintenance of the currency peg regime has the potential to undermine 
the international competitiveness of exporters in Barbados if an inflation rate differential 
emerges between Barbados and the United States. Specifically, if Barbados has a higher inflation 
rate than the US, not only will it fail to maintain external price stability in real terms, but 
domestic exporters will become less internationally competitive as the Barbadian dollar 
appreciates in real terms. The maintenance of a fixed exchange regime necessarily implies that 
Barbados has to resort to a combination of fiscal consolidation, wage restraint initiatives and 
generally keeping wage growth in line with productivity growth. Barbados has demonstrated that 
it has capacity, the discipline and social capital to do so since the latter half of the 1970s, and 
particularly during the early 1990s (see Table 3). Specifically, Barbados successfully established 
a Tripartite Social Partnership (government, trade unions and private sector) that enabled it to 
circumvent currency devaluation while implementing a structural adjustment program under the 
IMF (see Table 3).  
Still, given the vicissitudes of international capital markets, the maintenance of a fixed 
exchange regime is not without risk even when care is taken to temper “hot money” flows 
through capital flows (Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1998, 1999). Specifically, rapid and 
unanticipated cross-border capital flows may induce a currency crisis, which has the potential to 
induce a banking crisis. To the extent that the Barbadian government recognizes these risks, the 
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maintenance of the fixed exchange regime may not only serve as an institutional mechanism that 
fosters fiscal discipline, but also encourages the Barbadian monetary authorities to pay close 
attention to the financial health of the domestic banking system. While there is merit to the 
argument that Barbados has consistently exhibited greater fiscal discipline than Jamaica because 
of its fixed exchange regime (Henry and Miller, 2009), the potential for a “twin crisis” in the 
foreign exchange market and the banking sector suggests that a fixed exchange regime is not a 
costless commitment device. 
4. Summary and Conclusion 
 
This paper has developed a politics-finance-growth perspective to explain the 
mechanisms through which politics affects financial intermediation; and how in turn, the latter 
affects both the relative level of per capita income growth rates, and the relative stability of the 
growth paths across countries. The following two categories of redistributive policies have been 
conceptualized: SPM redistributive policies, which are motivated by the desire to equalize 
economic outcomes and engender financial exclusion; and SEM redistributive policies, which 
are primarily motivated by the desire to equalize opportunity and engender financial inclusion. 
On the one hand, SEM redistributive policies are recognized for their pro-poor and pro-growth 
qualities; on the other hand, SPM redistributive policies may compromise financial 
intermediation, which in turn may lead to a relatively low standard of living and a relatively 
unstable growth path. 
It has been shown that Jamaica fundamentally deviated from Barbados by adopting 
redistributive policies of the SPM variety in the 1970s. These policies are demonstrably 
financially exclusive. The politics-finance-growth perspective can explain the following two 
observations: (1) the standard of living has been falling in Jamaica relative to Barbados since the 
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1960s; and (2) the real per capita income gap between Jamaica and Barbados dramatically 
diverged during the oil shock episode of 1973; alternatively, Jamaica has had a relatively 
unstable growth path relative to Barbados. To the extent that Jamaica and Barbados have 
approximately the same economic potential, these two observations may be attributed to the 
adverse and potentially long-lived effects of SPM redistributive policies on financial 
intermediation in Jamaica in 1970s. 
It has also been found that Jamaica had a pre-independence income inequality gap with 
Barbados that apparently disappeared by the 1970s; however, a considerably wide real per capita 
gap emerged over the same period This implies that the SPM redistributive policies that Jamaica 
adopted may have left a considerably smaller economic pie to be shared, albeit more evenly, 
among a larger post-independence population. If so, then many people may have received a 
small slice of the actual economic pie in the 1970s compared to the 1960s. In other words, 
although Jamaica may have set out to raise its living standards and pull many people out of 
poverty, it ultimately failed to do so because the economic growth strategy that it adopted in the 
1970s was demonstrably neither pro-poor nor pro-growth over the long term.  
Policy Implications and Future Research 
Despite a series of structural adjustment programs spanning privatization, tax reforms, 
trade and financial liberalization, among others, in the 1990s (see Table 2), economic prosperity 
continues to elude Jamaica. But this experience is not unique to Jamaica. This phenomenon has 
also been observed in ailing Latin American countries that have been treated by structural 
adjustment programs at one point or another within the last four decades. The Jamaica-Barbados 
disparate growth experiences provides an important lesson for developing countries that are that 
still grappling with the social and economic problems associated with acute income inequality 
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and pervasive poverty. Specifically, it cautions against the use of redistributive policies of the 
socio-political variety. These policies may engender financial exclusion, and thereby constrain 
the ability of enterprising individuals to transform new ideas to novel products and services; 
hence, a higher standard of living may not materialize. 
 However, redistributive policies of the socio-economic variety that emphasize financial 
inclusion offer more promise; in particular, access to finance may enable enterprising individuals 
in developing countries to exploit commercial opportunities, and ultimately improve their 
welfare. In this regard, the emerging literature on financial deepening offers a potentially fruitful 
direction for future (Beck and Demirgüç-Kunt, 2008; Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Martinez Peria, 
2007). In particular, it may be worthwhile to undertake case studies on small island states to 
determine whether their ability to develop deeper financial markets is severely constrained by 
their relatively small size; and if so, how this liability of size may be overcome. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
26 
 
References 
 
Acemoglu, D. & Robinson, J.A. (2013). Economics versus Politics: Pitfalls of Policy Advice. 
Journal of Economic Perspectives, 27(2), 173-192. 
Aghion, P., & Bolton, P. (1997). A Theory of Trickle-Down Growth and Development. Review 
of Economic Studies, 64(2), 151–72.  
Antoine, R.-M. (1999). Commonwealth Caribbean Law and Legal Systems. London: Cavendish 
Publishers. 
Banskota, K., Johnson, S.R., & Stampley, G.L. (1987). Income Distribution in Jamaica. Staff 
Report 87-SR36, Center for Agriculture and Rural Development, Iowa University. 
Beck, T., & Demirgüç-Kunt, A. (2008). Access to Finance: An unfinished agenda. World Bank 
Economic Review, 22(3), 383-396. 
Beck, T., Demirgüç-Kunt, A., & Martinez Peria, M. (2007). Reaching Out: Access to and Use of 
Banking Services across Countries. Journal of Financial Economics, 85(1), 234-266. 
Beck, T., Demirgüç-Kunt, A., & Levine, R. (2003a). Law and finance: why does legal origin 
matter? Journal of Comparative Economics, 31(4), 653-675. 
Beck, T., Demirgüç-Kunt, A., & Levine, R. (2003b). Law, Endowments, and Finance. Journal of 
Financial Economics, 70, 137–81.  
Blackman, C. (2006). The Practice of Economic Management: A Caribbean Perspective. 
Kingston: Ian Randle Publishers. 
Bloom, D.E., Mahal, A., King, D., Henry-Lee, A., & Castillo, P. (2001). Globalization, 
Liberalization and Sustainable Human Development: Progress and Challenges in 
Jamaica. United Nation Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD).  
Demetriades, P., & Hussein, K. (1996). Does financial development cause economic growth? 
Time series evidence from 16 countries. Journal of Development Economics, 51, 387–
411. 
Downes, A.S. (2001). Economic Growth and Development in Barbados during the Twentieth 
Century. Integration & Trade, 15(5): 145–176.  
Handa, S., & King, D. (1997). Structural Adjustment Policies, Income Distribution and Poverty: 
A Review of the Jamaican Experience. World Development, 25(6): 915-930. 
Henry, P., & Miller, C. (2009). Institutions versus policies: A tale of two Islands. American 
Economic Review: Papers & Proceedings, 99(2), 261-267.  
IMF. (2010). Barbados: 2010 Article IV Consultation – Selected Issues. ÌMF Country Report 
No. 10/364. Washington, D.C.: IMF. 
Iyare, S., & Moore, W. (2011). Financial sector development and growth in small open 
economics. Applied Economics, 43, 1289-1297.  
Jung, W.S. (1986). Financial development and economic growth: international evidence 
Economic Development and Cultural Change, 34, 336–46. 
Kaminsky, G.L., & Reinhart, C.M. (1998). Financial Crises in Asia and Latin America: Then and 
Now. American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings, 88(2), 444-448.  
Kaminsky, G.L., & Reinhart, C.M. (1999). The Twin Crises: The Causes of Banking and 
Balance of Payments Problems. American Economic Review, 89(3), 473-500.  
King, D. (2001). The Evolution of Structural Adjustment and Stabilization Policy in Jamaica. 
Social and Economic Studies, 50(1), 1-53.  
Kirkpatrick, C., & Tennant, D. (2002). Responding to Financial Crisis: The Case of Jamaica. 
World Development, 30(11), 1933-1950. 
27 
 
 
Kornai, J. (1979). Resource-Constrained versus Demand-Constrained Systems. Econometrica, 
47, 118-130. 
Kornai, J. (1986). The Soft Budget Constraint. Kyklos, 39, 3-30. 
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R.W. (1997). Legal Determinants of 
External Finance. Journal of Finance, 52, 1131–1150. 
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R.W. (1998). Law and Finance. 
Journal of Political Economy, 106, 1113–1155.  
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R.W. (1999). The Quality of 
Government. Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 15, 222–279.  
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R.W. (2000). Investor Protection and 
Corporate Governance. Journal of Financial Economics, 58, 3–27. 
Levine, R. (1997). Financial Development and Economic Growth: Views and Agenda. Journal 
of Economic Literature, 35, 688–726. 
Levine, R. (1998). The Legal Environment, Banks, and Long-run Economic Growth.  Journal of 
Money, Credit, and Banking, 30, 596–620. 
Levine, R. (1999). Law, Finance, and Economic Growth. Journal of Financial Intermediation, 8, 
36–67. 
Levine, R. (2005). Finance and growth: Theory and evidence. In P. Aghion & S. Durlauf (Eds.), 
Handbook of Economic growth (pp. 865–934). Amsterdam: Elsevier. 
Mishkin, F.S. (2008). The Next Great Globalization: How Disadvantaged Nations Can Harness 
Their Financial Systems to Get Rich. Princeton: Princeton University Press.  
North, D.C., Wallis, J.J., Webb, S.B., & Weingast, B.R. (2013).  Limited Access Orders: An 
Introduction to the Conceptual Framework. In D.C. North, J.J. Wallis, S.B. Webb & B.R. 
Weingast (Eds.), Politics, Economics, and Problems of Development: In the Shadow of 
Violence (pp. 1-23). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
Odedokun, M.O. (1998). Financial intermediation and economic growth in developing countries. 
Journal of Economic Studies, 25, 203–24. 
Olson, M. (1965). The Logic of Collective Action. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.  
Payne, A. (1993). Westminster Adapted: The Political Order of the Commonwealth Caribbean. 
In J.I. Dominguez, R.A Pastor & R.D. Worrell (Eds.), Democracy in the Caribbean: 
Political, Economic and Social Perspectives (pp. 57-73). Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press. 
Rajan, R.G., & Zingales, L. (2003). The Great Reversals: The Politics of Financial Development 
in the 20
th
 Century.  Journal of Financial Economics, 69, 5–50. 
Springer, B. (2010). Barbados - public-private sector Partnership. Santiago: United Nations. 
Stigler, G. (1971). The theory of economic regulation. Bell Journal of Economics and 
Management Science, 2(1), 3-21. 
Stephens, E. H., & Stephens, J.D. (1986), Democratic Socialism in Jamaica. London: 
MacMillan. 
Williams, E. (1970). From Columbus to Castor. The History of the Caribbean 1492-1969. New 
York: Random House. 
28 
 
Worrell, D. (1981). External Influences and Domestic Policies: The Economies of Barbados and 
Jamaica in 1970s. Social and Economic Studies, 30(4), 134-155. 
Worrell, D. (1987). Small Island Economies: Structure and Performance in the English Speaking 
Caribbean Since 1970. New York: Prager. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
29 
 
Table 1: Selected Financial, Economic and Social Indicators for Jamaica and Barbados 
 Jamaica Barbados 
Gini coefficients (households as income unit) :   
Pre-independence (1950s) 0.58 0.46 
Post-independence (average, 1970s) 0.45 0.48 
Gross domestic savings (% GDP):   
Pre-independence (1960) 26.0 2.2 
Post-independence (average, 1970s) 18.3 10.8 
Gross capital formation (% GDP):   
Pre-independence (1960) 29.7 24.2 
Post-independence (average, 1970s) 17.1 23.2 
Real GDP per capita (US$):   
Pre-independence (1960) $2,208 $3,395 
Growth rate of GDP per capita:   
Average (from independence to 1972) 4.2 6.0 
Average (1972-1980) -4.3 2.7 
Fiscal deficit (% GDP):   
Average (from independence to 1972) 2.3 2.7 
Average (1972-1980) 15.5 5.3 
Inflation, consumer prices (Annual %):   
Pre-independence (1960s) 6.7 3.6 
Post-independence (average, 1970s) 17.3 13.9 
Trade openness (sum of exports and imports as a percentage of GDP):   
Pre-independence (1960) 71.3 109.4 
Post-independence (average, 1970s) 75.8 127.8 
Financial development – Bank credit as a percentage of GDP:   
Pre-independence (1960s) 9.5 27.5 
Post-independence (average, 1970s) 43.2 44.6 
 
Sources: Downes (2001, Table 2), Banskota, Johnson and Stampley (1987, Table 5), Henry and 
Miller (2009, Table 2) and World Bank (world development indicator database online). 
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Table 2: List of Major Developments 
Jamaica 
1960 – 1970 1971 – 1980 1981-1990s 
Economics: Economics: Economics: 
 Focus on light manufacturing and 
tourism as the sugar industry 
declines. 
 Extensive state intervention in the economy.  Stimulus package from IMF; World 
Bank Structural Adjustment Loan 
agreement. 
 Limited, if any, state intervention in 
the economy. 
 SOEs in banking, telecommunications, 
utilities, tourism, manufacturing, 
transportation & mining. 
 Relaxation, then elimination of import 
license requirements. 
 Bank of Jamaica replaces the 
currency board. 
 Share of public expenditure on housing, 
education & housing increased; subsidies on 
basic food items. 
 Import tariffs are reduced; Common 
External Tariff (CET) Agreement 
created, but effective tariff remains high 
under a complex tariff structure. 
 Investments & growth drivers - 
natural resource (i.e. bauxite) & 
tourism.  
 Public works program - “Special 
Employment Program”; but limited 
investment in physical infrastructure (i.e. 
roads, water supply). 
 Just before financial liberalization, 
additional restrictions imposed on the 
banking sector – credit controls. 
 Foreign direct investment (FDI) 
accounts for 30 % of domestic 
capital formation, and the lion share 
went to the bauxite industry. 
 Minimum wage is established; paid 
maternity leave; increase in worker 
dismissal costs; unions are empowered. 
 Liberalization of the banking sector 
underway (1991) – quantitative credit 
controls & ceilings on savings & 
deposits are eliminated; but high reserve 
requirements remain in place. 
  Extensive use of price controls.  Foreign exchange controls are lifted 
(1991), but liberalization is incomplete. 
  Foreign exchange controls; trading in the 
foreign exchange market is restricted to 
commercial banks. 
 Privatization of SOEs underway. 
  Import & export license requirements.  Tax reforms – greater focus on taxing 
final goods & services. 
  Jamaica Commodity Trading Corporation is 
established – government is now the sole 
importer. 
 Decline in social infrastructure (i.e. 
school, health care facilities). 
  Hostility toward foreign-owned enterprises 
& FDI. 
 Banking crisis (1996). Financial Sector 
Adjustment Company (FINSAC) is 
created to resolve crisis at cost of 37 % 
of GDP (1998); government equity stake 
in banks increased. Among the financial 
institutions deemed insolvent and/or 
closed are: 6 of the 9 commercial banks 
with a 60% share of total deposits and 5 
life insurance companies with a 90% 
share of premium income.  
  High marginal tax rates on personal & 
corporate income - 80% at highest tax 
bracket; expansion of the informal economy. 
 Hurricane Gilbert in 1988 – physical 
infrastructure destroyed. 
  Ceilings on interest rates on savings, 
deposits & loans; quantitative credit 
controls; high cash reserve & liquid asset 
ratios. 
 Jamaica Promotions Corporations  
(JAMPRo), is established (1988) – 
promote trade & investment. 
  Oil shock in 1973.  
Politics: Politics: Politics: 
 JLP (1962 - ).   PNP (1972 - 1980) – democratic socialism.  JLP (1980-1989). 
  JLP (- 1972; 1980 - ).  PNP (1989 - ). 
 
Sources: Bloom et al. (2001), Handa and King (1997), King (2001), Kirkpatrick and Tennant (2002), 
Stephens and Stephens (1986) and Worrell (1981, 1987).  
Notes: JLP: Jamaica Labour Party; PNP: People`s National Party; SOEs: State-owned enterprises. 
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Table 3: List of Major Developments 
Barbados 
1960s – 1970 1971 – 1980 1981-1990s 
   
Economics: Economics: Economics: 
 Focus on light manufacturing 
and tourism as sugar industry 
declines. 
 Currency peg is established 
(1975) – parity of B$2:US$1 
 Introduces the first 
unemployment insurance scheme 
in the Caribbean (1981). 
 Export-led growth strategy 
is adopted.  
 Oil shock in 1973.  Financial assistance is sought 
from the IMF, World Bank & 
Inter-American Development 
Bank (IADB). 
 Development of social 
infrastructure is already 
underway (since late 
1950s). 
  Experiences one of its deepest 
recession in 25 years - decline in 
the tourism sector in the early 
1990s. 
 Development of various 
institutions to finance and 
promote development 
agenda. 
  Tripartite Social Partnership 
(government, trade unions & 
private sector) is formed in 1993 
to restrain wages and prices & 
avoid currency devaluation. 
   Collapse of Trade Confirmers 
(1986), an unregulated finance 
company. 
Politics: Politics: Politics: 
 DLP (1966 - ).  DLP ( - 1976).  DLP ( - 1986). 
  BLP (1976 - ).  BLP ( - 1986; 1994 - ). 
 
Sources: Blackman (2006), Downes (2001), IMF (2010), Springer (2010) and Worrell (1981). 
Notes: BLP: Barbados Labour Party; DLP: Democratic Labour Party. 
